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Separating Fact from Fiction in the
Debate over Application of The Alien
Tort Claims Act to Violations of
Fundamental Human Rights
by Corporations
By TERRY COLLINGSWORTH*
THE ALIEN TORT Claims Act ("ATCA")I was passed by the first
Congress in 1789 and provides federal courts with jurisdiction over
violations of the "law of nations." Largely dormant for many years, the
ATCA was revived in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala,2 a 1980 decision from the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. There, a former police offi-
cial from Paraguay who was residing in the United States was found
subject to suit by one of his former prisoners, whom he had tortured.
Several subsequent courts agreed that the ATCA was available for
"modern" human rights cases, and the legal process for bringing the
rule of law to human rights violators was launched." To make clear
that Congress agreed with this development, the Torture Victim Pro-
tection Act ("TVPA") was passed with wide bipartisan support in
1992. 4 It applies only to torture and extrajudicial killing, and the com-
mittee reports in both the Senate and House expressly stated that the
ATCA remains a viable and distinct avenue for addressing other viola-
tions of the law of nations. 5
* Executive Director, International Labor Rights Fund ("ILRF"). J.D. 1982, Duke
University School of Law; B.A. 1974, Cleveland State University.
1. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1993).
2. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
3. See, e.g., Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 240-41 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 518 U.S.
1005 (1996); Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 887; In re Estate of Marcos Human Rights Litig., 25 F.3d
1467, 1475 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 941 (1995); Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d
844, 847 (11th Cir. 1996).
4. See 28 U.S.C. § 1350, note 2 (Supp. 2002).
5. See H.R. REP. No. 102-367(1), at 4 (1991), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 84 (ex-
plaining that the Torture Victim Protection Act ("TVPA") was passed to codify Filartiga,
and that the Alien Tort Trade Claims Act ("ATCA") should be viewed as a parallel remedy
that can also accommodate future evolution of customary international law); see also S. REP.
No. 102-249, at 4-5 (1991).
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I. Introduction-Framing the Debate
There was virtually no dissent, judicially or politically, to opening
the federal courts to foreign victims of human rights violations with
the ATCA and TVPA, and allowing individuals, usually former military
officials, to be brought to justice in the United States. 6 The case
against former dictator Ferdinand Marcos, after he fled the Philip-
pines and took up residence in Hawaii, was perhaps the most
prominent. 7
In 1996, beginning with a case filed by the International Labor
Rights Fund ("ILRF") against Unocal Corporation for using slave la-
bor to construct a natural gas pipeline in Burma, a series of cases have
been brought under the ATCA and TVPA alleging that corporations
have knowingly participated in human rights violations., The prospect
of facing scrutiny for human rights violations, and possibly having to
pay large damage awards, has alarmed the international business com-
munity, which has declared war on the ATCA. Business Week reported
that on November 18, 2002, business groups met to plot a strategy to
repeal the ATCA or otherwise limit its application to corporations. 9
Among the groups participating are USA Engage and the National
Foreign Trade Council ("NFTC"), two lobbying groups representing
multinational corporations.'" These groups are using their resources
and access to lobby the Bush Administration and Congress for relief
from the reach of the ATCA, and are seeking either a legislative res-
cue from ATCA cases, or a political bailout through intervention by
the Justice Department seeking dismissal of the cases on "foreign pol-
icy" grounds.'
6. In Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 800 (D.C. Cir. 1984),Judge Bork
took issue with whether the ATCA provided a right of action, and argued that it was simply
a limited grant of jurisdiction. In passing the TVPA, Congress expressly rejected Judge
Bork's position. See supra note 5; see also Doe v. Islamic Salvation Front, 993 F. Supp. 3, 8
(D.D.C. 1998) (holding "[tihe interpretation of international law in [Kadic] in 1995 is far
more timely than the interpretations set forth in Tel-Oren, which examined international
law as it stood almost 15 years ago"); Bao Ge v. Li Peng, 201 F. Supp. 2d 14, 22 n.5 (D.D.C.
2000). Thus, Judge Bork's position has been uniformly rejected.
7. See In re Estate of Marcos Human Rights Litig., 25 F.3d 1467, 1475 (9th Cir. 1994),
cert. denied, 532 U.S. 941 (1995).
8. A summaly of the ILRF's cases is in section I11, infra.
9. See Paul Magnusson, Making a Federal Case out of Overseas Abuses, Bus. WK. Nov. 25,
2002, at 78.
10. On file at the ILRF is the program agenda for a November 14, 2002 meeting on
the ATCA convened by USA Engage and National Foreign Trade Council ("NFTC").
11. See Magnusson, supra note 9, at 78.
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Recently, Exxon Mobil, the United States oil giant, and Rio Tinto,
a British mining company, managed to get the State Department's Le-
gal Advisor, William H. Taft IV, to intervene with the courts and re-
quest that pending ATCA cases be dismissed on foreign policy
grounds.1 2 Reaction against the Bush Administration's enthusiastic in-
tervention in pending cases, which is nothing less than an attempt by
the executive branch to nullify the ATCA, has been strong. Fifty mem-
bers of Congress sent a letter to Secretary of State Colin Powell expres-
sing concern over the State Department's intervention in the Exxon
Mobil case.' 3 In a brief filed with the court, the ILRF argued that the
Bush Administration was blatantly violating the separation of powers
doctrine by seeking to prevent the enforcement of a statute that was
passed by Congress and signed into law by the President.14 This posi-
tion was supported by the Declaration of Harold Koh, who was Assis-
tant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor in
the Clinton Administration, and is now Professor of Law at Yale Law
School. Professor Koh cited extensive case law to support his conclu-
sion that "numerous federal courts have already adjudicated claims
similar to those presented [in the Exxon case], making clear that such
claims are subject to judicially manageable standards and do not re-
quire policy determinations that properly fall within non-judicial
discretion." 5
The business community's attack on the ATCA cannot withstand
objective legal analysis mainly because the ATCA case law prior to the
first cases being brought against corporations is well reasoned,
strongly supported by precedent, and nearly unanimous in holding
that the ATCA does allow claims for violations of the law of nations to
12. The Exxon Mobil letter is on file with the ILRF, and is posted at www.laborrights.
org. See Letter from William H. Taft, IV, Legal Advisor, Department of State, to Louis F.
Oberorfer, District Court Judge, United States District Court for the District of Columbia
(July 29, 2002), available at www.laborrights.org (last visited Mar. 11, 2003) (on file with
author at ILRF) [hereinafter "Taft Letter"]. The Exxon Mobil court has yet to rule on
whether the letter has any legal effect, or is simply an advisory opinion. The Rio Tinto
letter preceded the Exxon Mobile letter, and the court there dismissed the case based
upon the State Department's arguments. See Sarei v. Rio Tinto, 221 F. Supp. 2d 1116,
1179-83 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
13. Letter from Congressional members, to Honorable Colin Powell, Secretary of
State, United States Department of State (Oct. 8, 2002), available at www.laborrights.org
(last visited Mar. 11, 2003) (on file with author at ILRF).
14. Supplemental Opposition to Motion to Dismiss, available at www.laborrights.org
(on file with author at ILRF). ILRF's co-counsel in the case are Michael Hausfeld and
Agnieszka M. Fryszman of Cohen,'Milstein, Hausfeld & Toll in Washington, D.C.
15. Aff. of Harold H. Koh, In reJohn Doe I v. Exxon Mobile Corp. 1 26 (Aug. 28, 2002)
available at www.laborrights.org (on file with author at ILRF) [hereinafter "Koh Affidavit"].
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be brought by aliens in federal court. To take on the ATCA directly
would require repudiation of the many post-Filartiga cases, or would
require courts to somehow conclude that corporations, but not indi-
viduals, are immune from ATCA liability. Since neither position can
be supported on the merits, the business community has resorted to a
series of misleading fictions about the scope and application of the
ATCA. The remainder of this paper will examine and rebut the major
arguments made by the business community as it seeks to undo the
accumulated precedent of the historic ATCA.
II. Separating Fact from Fiction in the ATCA Debate
FICTION 1: The broad scope of "international law" will make it
impossible for well-intentioned companies to know what conduct
might subject them to liability.
FACT: The ATCA applies only to violations of the law of nations,
which the federal courts have interpreted narrowly to cover only geno-
cide, war crimes, extrajudicial killing, slavery, torture, unlawful deten-
tion, and crimes against humanity.
This is a short list.16 Each of these crimes meets the high standard
of constituting customary international law, which requires a substan-
tial degree of specificity and international consensus. 17 Those who op-
pose the application of the ATCA to corporations attempt to create
the impression that the list of possible violations is not clear, and the
uncertainty might result in an inadvertent violation by a company that
simply could not predict what the law requires. This is simply false. As
the summary of the current ILRF cases against corporations that fol-
lows this section demonstrates, well accepted case law is very strict in
limiting the reach of the ATCA to allegations of genocide,' 8 war
crimes," extrajudicial killing,2 ' slavery,2' torture,2 2 unlawful deten-
16. Judge Edwards' concurrence in Tel-Oren noted that the "'law of nations' is not
stagnant and should be construed as it exists today among the nations of the world." Tel-
Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 777 (D.C. Cir. 1984); see also Kadic v. Karadzic,
70 F.3d 232, 238 (2d Cir. 1995) cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1005 (1996) (stating courts must
interpret international law under the ATCA as "it has evolved and exists among the nations
of the world today"). However, both of these courts also noted that the standard requires
universal consensus by the community of nations. Thus, it will require extraordinary condi-
tions to add to the list of violations of the "law of nations."
17. See, e.g., Kadic, 70 F.3d at 240-41; Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 887 (2d Cir.
1980); In re Estate of Marcos Human Rights Litig., 25 F.3d 1467, 1475 (9th Cir. 1994), cert.
denied, 513 U.S. 1126 (1995); Abebe:Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844, 847 (11th Cir. 1996).
18. See, e.g., Kadic, 70 F.3d at 240-41.
19. See, e.g., id.; Doe v. Islamic Salvation Front, 993 F. Supp. 3, 8 (D.D.C. 1998).
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tion,2"3 and crimes against humanity.2 4 Indeed, section 702 of the Re-
statement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law adopts this list of the
"international law of human rights," adding only "systematic racial dis-
crimination" to the finite list consistently cited by federal courts in
ATCA cases. Thus, in order to face even the prospect of a lawsuit under
the ATCA, a corporation would have to be directly implicated in viola-
tions of fundamental human rights that are clearly defined under in-
ternational law and constitute extreme derogation of the standards set
by the international community. This limitation should alleviate any
concern over the potential ATCA liability of companies. Indeed, be-
cause most companies are responsible actors, the list of companies
that are engaged in business practices that might expose them to lia-
bility under the ATCA is a short one.
To emphasize the very limited list of human rights violations that
constitute the law of nations, it is significant to note that, for example,
in Flores v. So. Peru Copper Corp.,25 the court dismissed claims under the
ATCA for personal injuries resulting from environmental torts. After
reviewing the strict standards applicable to identifying international
20. See, e.g., Kadic, 70 F.3d at 240-41, 243-44 (noting that when Congress passed the
TVPA, it codified the ATCA's application to extrajudicial killing and torture); Estate of
Winston Cabello v. Fernandez-Larios, 157 F. Supp. 2d 1345 (S.D Fla. 2001) (finding subject
matter jurisdiction under the ATCA and TVPA for the extrajudicial killing of plaintiff in
Chile by a member of the Chilean military).
21. See, e.g., Doe v. Unocal Corp., 110 F. Supp. 2d 1294, 1307-08 (C.D. CA 2000)
(citing Kadic, 70 F.3d at 234); Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 794 (D.C.
Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J., concurring), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1003 (1985); NCGUB v. Unocal
Corp., 176 F.R.D. 329, 348 (C.D. Cal. 1997); Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d
424, 443 (D.C. N.J. 1999).
22. Torture is universally acknowledged to be a violation of "the law of nations." See,
e.g,, Abebe-Jira, 72 F.3d at 847-48; Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 184 (D. Mass.
1995). The TVPA specifically defines "torture" to include "mental pain or suffering" result-
ing from "the threat of imminent death." 28 U.S.C. § 1350, Historical and Statutory Notes
§ 3(b) (I )-(2) (C) (1993). The definition of "torture" tinder the TVPA is the same as under
the Torture Convention. See S. REP. No. 102-249, 1991 WL 258662, at *6. Ahen the Senate
ratified the Torture Convention in 1990, the Senate Report made clear that "torture" was
consistent with the definition of cruel and unusual punishment of the Eighth Amendment
to the U.S. Constitution. See also 136 CONG. REC. S17486-01, 1991 WAL 168442.
23. See, e.g., Abebe-Jira, 72 F.3d at 844; Martinez v. City of Los Angeles, 141 F.3d 1373,
1384 (9th Cir. 1998).
24. See, e.g., Kadic, 70 F.3d at 240-44; Xuncax, 886 F. Supp. at 187 (holding that defen-
dant's act of bombing plaintiffs through aerial attacks constituted cruel, inhuman or de-
grading treatment in violation of international law under the Convention Against Torture
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment); Wiwa v. Royal Dutch
Petroleum Co., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3293, at *29 (S.D.N.Y 2002) (defining crimes
against humanity as, inter alia, "torture ... [and] inhumane acts ... intentionally causing
great suffering or serious injury to body or mental or physical health").
25. Flores v. So. Peru Copper Corp., 2002 WL 1587224 at "9-10 (S.D. N.Y. 2002).
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human rights violations,.,the court held that environmental claims do
not "violate 'well-established, universally recognized norms of interna-
tional law.' "21
The hypocrisy of those in the international business community
who oppose the ATCA by asserting a fear of uncertain international
standards is reinforced by the fact that virtually all of the companies
that are currently involved in ATCA litigation have joined one or
more "voluntary" initiative's In this context, they make a commitment
to respect a range of human rights far broader than the scope of the
law of nations, in many cases by issuing a detailed "code of conduct."
The companies profess compliance with these purely voluntary initia-
tives with great fanfare and publicity. However, they do so knowing
that none of the initiatives have an enforcement mechanism. For ex-
ample, many multinational firms have embraced the United Nation's
Global Compact ("Global Compact") in which the companies pledge
to "support and respect the protection of internationally proclaimed
human rights."2 7 However, there is not a word about enforcement in
the Global Compact. That some of the member companies are now
complaining they may actually be held accountable by the ATCA for
violations within the range of those standards they have pledged to
honor raises obvious questions about the nature of their putative com-
mitment to the voluntary programs they have embraced with the ex-
pectation that the public would trust that, as good corporate citizens,
they would honor their commitment. This trust has been abused.
FICTION 2: Companies can be held liable for the conduct of for-
eign governments that violate human rights simply by investing in
projects located in those countries.
FACT: A company cannot be liable under the ATCA for simply
investing in a country where human rights violations occur. Rather,
the company must knowingly participate in a violation of the law of
nations.
The corporate defendants in the ATCA cases consistently attack a
straw man by arguing that they unfairly face liability for nothing more
than investing in countries that have bad governments. This too is
false. As recently articulated by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit in the Unocal case, in order to face ATCA liability, a party
must either be the direct perpetrator of the criminal act or knowingly aid
26. Id. at *11 (quoting Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 888 (2d Cir. 1980)).
27. Text of the U.N. Global Compact, available at www.unglobalcompact.org (last vis-
ited Mar. 11, 2003).
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and abet the direct perpetrator. 2 The latter standard requires "know-
ing practical assistance or encouragement that has a substantial effect
on the perpetration of the crime."2 9
The Unocal case was recently accepted for en banc review by the
Ninth Circuit.30 Thus, while the original decision can no longer be
cited as precedent, it is significant to note that the court's ruling on
the level of complicity required to hold a corporation liable is based
on a well-established standard of liability for criminal acts that dates
back to at least the Nuremberg Tribunals where German industrialists
were found guilty of war crimes for aiding and abetting the Nazi re-
gime. ' Subsequent international tribunals created to address the
crimes in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia likewise rely upon the
basic and universally accepted legal principle of aiding and abetting,
or stated another way, complicity.3 2 Moreover, this aiding and abet-
ting standard is routinely applied by United States courts in tort and
criminal law cases.33 Indeed, even the UN Global Compact embraces a
standard calling for companies to "make sure they are not complicit
in human rights abuses."'3 4
28. John Doe III v. Unocal Corp., 2002 WL 31063976 at *9-10 (9th Cir. 2002).
29. Id.
30. By Order dated February 14, 2003, the Ninth Circuit accepted the case for en banc
review. On February 28, 2003, the Court set a June 17, 2003 argument date.
31. See, e.g., United States of America v. Friedrich Rick, 6 Trials of War Criminals Before
the Nuremberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 10 (1952).
32. See Prosecutor v. Duko Tadic, ICTY-94-1 at 673-74 (May 7, 1997) available at http:/
/www.un.org/icty/judgment.htm (last visited Mar. 11, 2003) (Yugoslavia Tribunal relied
on the Nuremberg cases, noting that because "the accused did not directly commit some of
the offences charged [and] the Trial Chamber must determine whether the conduct of the
accused ... sufficiently connects the accused to the crimes .... The most relevant sources
for such a determination are the [Nuremberg] war crimes trials, which resulted in several
convictions for complicitous conduct."); Prosecutor v. Georges Anderson Nderubumwe
Rutaganda, ICTR-96-3, at 385-86 (Dec. 6, 1999) (finding defendant Rutaganda guilty of
genocide for having aided and abetted in the destruction of the Tutsi ethnic group, be-
cause he drove a vehicle from which persons obtained rifles later used to kill three Tutsis.
Although Rutaganda, in this particular charge, did not personally participate in the distri-
bution of the weapons, the Tribunal stated "[i] n the opinion of the Chamber, the Accused
is individually criminally responsible by reason of such acts for having aided and abetted in
the preparation for and perpetration of killings of members of the Tutsi group.").
33. See, e.g., Saunders v. Super. Ct., 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 438, 446 (Ct. App. 1994) (citing
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876(b)); Rael v. Cadena, 604 P.2d 822 (N.M. Ct. App.
1979); Keet v. Hainline, 331 P.2d 397 (Okla. 1958); Halberstam v. Welch, 705 F.2d 472, 478
(D.C. Cir. 1983) ("[a]iding-abetting focuses on whether a defendant knowingly gave 'sub-
stantial assistance' to someone who performed wrongful conduct, not on whether the de-
fendant agreed to join the wrongful conduct").
34. Text of the U.N. Global Compact, available at www.unglobalcompact.org (last vis-
ited Mar. 11, 2003).
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Thus, corporate liability in ATCA cases will be based upon the
well accepted legal standard that if the hired gun is guilty, the person
or corporation who hired him likewise faces legal responsibility. It is
simply not true, contrary to the assertions made by members of USA
Engage and NFTC, that corporations may face liability for simply in-
vesting in countries with questionable human rights practices. Simple
investment, without direct participation in a crime or knowingly aid-
ing and abetting the crime, is not sufficient to establish liability. Based
on well established law, a company must be a knowing participant in
wrongful acts to be liable under the ATCA.
FICTION 3: Application of the ATCA will discourage foreign
investment.
FACT: The ATCA will have no impact on legitimate foreign
investment.
Those opposing application of the ATCA to behavior by corpora-
tions raise the specter of lost investment opportunities as a key reason
for granting corporations legal immunity. This was the primary justifi-
cation offered by the State Department's Legal Advisor, William H.
Taft IV, in his recent letter to the court in the Exxon Mobil case, urg-
ing dismissal of the case.i 5
First, reinforcing the two points discussed above, there are few
companies that are seeking to invest in projects that would compel
knowing corporate participation in genocide, war crimes, extrajudi-
cial killing, slavery, torture, unlawful detention, or crimes against hu-
manity. Second, one hopes that we continue to honor the principles
established by the Nuremberg Tribunals, and that such extreme be-
havior by corporations which violates human rights is not insulated
from the reach of law simply because it is accompanied by an invest-
ment. Unlawful behavior that leads to torture, slavery, or other human
rights violations, even if done in the context of an investment, is sim-
ply not worthy of protection by United States foreign policy, or inter-
national law.
In response to Legal Advisor Taft's effort to immunize Exxon Mo-
bil from ATCA liability, several prominent human rights experts
strongly objected to advancing speculative concerns about the poten-
tial impact on investment. For example, Professor Harold Koh noted
in his affidavit filed with the court that it is repugnant to United States
policy and values to promote the competitiveness of United States
35. See Taft Letter, supra note 12, at 4-5.
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companies by providing them with legal immunity for human rights
violations. 36 As one example, he cites the Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act ("FCPA"). No court would consider arguments from the executive
branch to waive the FCPA to allow United States companies to engage
in bribery and other corrupt practices on equal footing to remain
competitive with foreign companies. 37 This is not a competition that is
permitted by United States law or policy. Likewise, and perhaps more
obviously, there is no basis to demand legal immunity to allow United
States companies to use slaves and torture workers so that they can be
on an equal competitive footing with foreign companies. This would
undo cornerstone values of United States citizens, particularly respect
for the rule of law and the belief that no one is above the law.
More fundamentally, again responding to Mr. Taft's defense of
Exxon Mobil, several Indonesia experts challenged the notion that
United States companies would be placed at a competitive disadvan-
tage if they were subject to suit for fundamental human rights viola-
tions. For example, Edmund McWilliams, a retired, decorated senior
foreign service officer who was stationed for several years in Indone-
sia, asserts in an affidavit filed with the court in the Exxon Mobil case
that the government of Indonesia "has long welcomed U.S. invest-
ment in many sectors of its economy ... and is reliant on continued
foreign direct investment .... It is therefore highly unlikely that [In-
donesia] would reject suitable proposals for U.S. direct or indirect in-
vestment."38 Further, he observes that "[t]hroughout my tour in
Indonesia, I reviewed or was aware of several cables in which serious
concerns were expressed about the human rights abuses committed
by the TNI units assigned to the Exxon-Mobil facilities."39 The State
Department itself was highly critical of the Indonesian military's role
in the torture and murder of noncombatant civilians in Aceh. 40 This
had absolutely no impact on Indonesia's willingness to accept United
States foreign investment, including from Exxon Mobil, and certainly
did not affect the government of Indonesia's enthusiastic acceptance
of United States military aid.41
36. See Koh Affidavit, supra note 15, 1 19.
37. Id. 1 20.
38. Aff. of Edmond McWilliams, In reJohn Doe I v. Exxon Mobile Corp. 1 9 (Aug. 23,
2002) available at www.laborrights.org (last visited Mar. 11, 2003) (on file with author at
ILRF) [hereinafter "McWilliams Affidavit"].
39. Id. 1 11. The TNI is the Indonesian army unit assigned to public security.
40. See id. 1 5. See Koh Affidavit, supro note 15, 11 14-16.
41. See McWilliams' Affidavit, supra note 38, 11 6-9.
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Most important, the Indonesian government is certainly cogni-
zant that the ATCA case at issue is against Exxon Mobil, a private com-
pany, and not the government of Indonesia. Indeed, it would defy
common sense to assert that Exxon Mobil might face economic retali-
ation from the Indonesian government because it was sued for being
complicit in the government's human rights violations. The govern-
ment would more likely be supportive of its business partner and work
to mount a mutual defense because the government remains desper-
ate for foreign investment and would not shut off United States invest-
ment based solely on litigation against Exxon Mobil. At the end of the
day, there is no question that the State Department's professed con-
cerns about foreign investment are based on pure speculation, which
is at odds with the reality of Indonesia. 42 Moreover, even if there was
some economic impact of enforcing human rights standards against
United States companies, compliance with the law of nations is an
overriding legal principle that is not subject to waiver. There is no
acknowledged "making money" exception to the United States legal
obligation to respect the rule of law and fundamental human rights
norms.
44 3
FICTION 4: Trial lawyers will reap huge verdicts against companies
using the ATCA, even if the cases are frivolous.
FACT: The federal courts are well equipped to dismiss cases lack-
ing credible evidence.
The multinationals seeking legal immunity from the ATCA and
TVPA argue that it is unfair to expose them to the potential for huge
jury verdicts made possible by trial lawyers who can convert even frivo-
lous claims into jury verdicts. There is no basis for the international
business community to claim that federal courts have treated them
unfairly in these cases. No such case has even made it to verdict yet,
and the courts have not hesitated to dismiss cases that fail to provide
specific links between the corporate defendant and the human rights
violations. For example, in Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc.,44 the court
dismissed generalized claims of human rights violations that failed to
link a specific injury to an act of the defendant corporation. The
plaintiff there sought to be a representative of all of the victims of the
42. Id. 11.
43. See, e.g., id. 19-20.
44. 969 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. La. 1997), qf/Pd, 197 F.3d 161 (5th Cir.1999).
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military's violence against indigenous people without showing that he
personally suffered any injury attributable to Freeport's conduct.45
In another, more recent, example, Flores v. Southern Peru Copper
Corporation,46 the court granted defendant's motion to dismiss in an
ATCA case based on environmental torts. The court held that plain-
tiffs had failed to state a claim for relief because the claims did not
"violate 'well-established, universally recognized norms of interna-
tional law.' " 47 There are numerous other examples where the courts
have had no difficulty dismissing ATCA claims, most often because of
failure to state a claim for violation of the law of nations. 48 Another
basis for dismissal in several cases has been the doctrine of forum non
conveniens, resulting in the transfer of the cases to the forum where
the violations occurred. 4- However, as the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit stated in Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 5°1 the ATCA
makes "violation[s] of international law . . . 'our business,' as such
conduct not only violates the standards of international law but also as
a consequence violates our domestic law. '51 In other words, the
ATCA's grant of jurisdiction in cases involving foreign actors largely
presumes that the cases will be brought in United States courts despite
any foreign origin of the facts, and the use of forum non conveniens
should be sparing.
The sky-is-falling claims of runaway verdicts made by the business
community simply are not based in reality. Indeed, there has yet to be
a verdict against a corporate defendant in an ATCA case. The Unocal
case will likely be the first to reach ajury. The federal courts generally
are not a place where runaway jury verdicts are a threat. The compa-
nies named as defendants in ATCA cases have hired the finest corpo-
rate law firms in the country, and they have the resources to defend
themselves vigorously. If the cases are not legitimate, they will be dis-
missed, as has already been the case in many instances. If, however,
they are based on evidence that a company knowingly participated in
violations of fundamental human rights, then the companies will be
45. Beanal, 197 F.3d at 164-65.
46. Flores v. So. Peru Copper Corp., 2002 WL 1587224 at *9-10 (S.D. N.Y. 2002).
47. Id. at *11 (quoting Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 888 (2d Cir. 1980)).
48. See, e.g., Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d 424, 443 (D.C. N.J. 1999);
Hamid v. Price Waterhouse, 51 F.3d 1411 (9th Cir. 1995); Carmichael v. United Techs.
Corp., 835 F.2d 109 (5th Cir. 1988); Bigio v. Coca-Cola, 239 F.3d 440 (2d Cir. 2000).
49. See, e.g., Aquinda v. Texaco, Inc., 142 F. Supp. 2d 534 (S.D. N.Y. 2001), affd, 303
F.3d 470 (2d Cir. 2002).
50. 226 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 941 (2001).
51. Id. at 106.
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required to face a trial, where the factfinder will evaluate their various
defenses, as ably presented by defense counsel.
FICTION 5: Enforcement of the ATCA will undermine the "war on
terrorism."
FACT: The ATCA is one of the few tools available to use the rule of
law to go after those who support and benefit from terrorism. That
some of those responsible for human rights violations are United
States-based multinationals does not make the terrorism any less real
to the victims. Indeed, allowing such companies to act with impunity
conveys the distinct message that the war on terrorism is only in-
tended to protect United States citizens and that foreign victims of
atrocities for the benefit of United States companies are of no con-
cern to the Bush Administration. Indeed, with the United States gov-
ernment's recent repudiation of the treaty creating the International
Criminal Court, the role of the ATCA in enforcing the rule of law for
human rights violations is particularly vital.
The State Department's Legal Advisor Taft has, on behalf of the
Bush Administration, intervened in the Exxon Mobil case and shame-
lessly raised the war on terrorism as one of the justifications for seek-
ing dismissal of the case. 52 The Exxon Mobil case seeks to hold Exxon
Mobil liable for the acts of its security forces in Aceh, which have ter-
rorized the local population while protecting the company's valuable
natural gas assets. 53 Mr. Taft asserts, "U.S. counter-terrorism initiatives
could be imperiled in numerous ways if Indonesia and its officials cur-
tailed cooperation in response to perceived disrespect for its sover-
eign interests."54
The reaction to the "terrorism card" cynically played by the Bush
Administration to protect Exxon Mobil from possible liability reflects
a substantial consensus that the State Department has compromised
its credibility on human rights issues by taking a position so utterly
lacking in objective support and so inconsistent with past efforts di-
rected to improving human rights in Indonesia. Sixteen members of
the House of Representatives and two Senators wrote letters to the
State Department prior to the issuance of the Taft letter. The Mem-
bers of Congress warned:
We have been concerned about the lack of accountability for
human rights abuses in Indonesia .... We do not believe that
52. See supra notes 11-14 and the accompanying text.
53. See discussion of the case, infra, section IIl(B).
54. Taft Letter, supra note 12, at 3.
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litigation involving allegations of human rights abuses against Ex-
xon Mobil, a private company operating in Indonesia, will ad-
versely affect the interests of the United States. ( ] To the
contrary, intervention by the State Department would send pre-
cisely the wrong message: that the United States supports the cli-
mate of impunity for human rights abuses in Indonesia.
55
Professor Harold Koh noted that the State Department's serious
assertions about the implications of the case with respect to United
States relations with Indonesia were explicitly based on speculation, as
the State Department conceded that "whether this adjudication ulti-
mately arms U.S. interests will depend entirely upon 'how the case
might unfold in the course of litigation." 56
Perhaps the most significant point made by many of the critics is
that the case was filed against Exxon Mobil, not the Indonesian gov-
ernment. For example, Kenneth Roth, the Executive Director of
Human Rights Watch, stated in an article critical of the State Depart-
ment's letter: " [T] he suit is not brought against an Indonesian govern-
ment institution but against Exxon Mobil for alleged complicity in
serious human rights abuse. It is entirely appropriate for U.S. courts
to uphold basic standards of conduct for U.S.-based corporations. '" 57
Thus, the case does not present any generalized attack on the govern-
ment of Indonesia's conduct, and it should not be assumed that In-
donesians are incapable of making this distinction.
The best evidence that the State Department's professed concern
that the Exxon Mobil litigation would insult the government of Indo-
nesia is not credible is that the United States government has consist-
ently and directly criticized the government of Indonesia for its failure
to take action against human rights abuses, apparently without major
consequence. Dating back to the regime of General Suharto,5 8
through the transition government of President Habibie, 59 and the
55. Letter from Congressional members to Honorable William H. Taft, Legal Advisor,
Department of State (June 17, 2002) (on file with author at ILRF).
56. Koh Affidavit, supra note 15, 11 (quoting Taft Letter, supfra note 12, at p.2, n.I ).
57. Kenneth Roth, US. Hypocrisy in Indonesia Human Rights, INT 'L HERALD TRIB., Aug.
14, 2002, at 1.
58. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, INDONESIA REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICEs FOR 1997
(1998), available at http: / /www.state.gov/www/ global/human_rights/l1997-hrp-report/
indonesi.html (last visited Mar. 11, 2003).
59. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, INDONESIA REPORT ON HUMAN RIGIHTS PRAcrICES FOR
1999 (2000), available at http://www.state.gov/www/global/humanrighLs/1999-hrp-re-
port/indonesi.html (last visited Mar. 11, 2003)...
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brief tenure of President Wahid,11 the first democratically-elected
President, up to a recent report in March 2002 covering part of the
current term of President Megawati, 61 the United States government
has condemned the failure of the government of Indonesia to take
effective action to prevent and punish human rights violations perpe-
trated by its military security forces. In its most recent report the State
Department strongly criticized the current Indonesian government's
record on human rights, and particularly its failure to bring perpetra-
tors of abuses to justice: "[T] he Government's critical failure to pur-
sue accountability for human rights violations reinforces the
impression that there would be continued impunity for security
abuses."62
Congress also issued its own broadside in Senate Resolution 91,
which criticized Indonesia's failure to prosecute the perpetrators of
human rights abuses, and directed that:
[O]fficials of the Department of State should, at every appropriate
meeting with officials of the Government of Indonesia, stress the
importance of ending the climate of impunity that shields those
individuals, including senior members of the Indonesian military,
suspected of perpetrating, collaborating in, or covering up extra-
judicial killings and abuses of human rights in Indonesia.63
Further, even the federal judiciary has been involved in critiquing
the government of Indonesia's human rights record, with no measura-
ble negative consequence,. In Doe v. Major Gen. Lumintang,6 4 Major
General Johny Lumintang, the vice chief of staff of the Indonesian
military, was sued personally for human rights violations under the
ATCA, and at a non-jury trial held on September 13, 2001, Magistrate
Judge Alan Kay awarded plaintiffs $66,000,000.65
This record of participation by all three branches of the United
States government in direct public criticism of the Indonesian govern-
ment on human rights grounds, without consequence, contrasts
sharply with the State Department's unsupported assertion in defense
60. See, e.g., U.S. DFP'T OF STATE, INDONESIA REPORT ON HUMAN RICHTS PRAC7rtICES FOR
2000 (2001), available at http://www.state.gov/www/global/hman_rights/2000_hrppre-
port/indonesi.html (last visited Mar. 11, 2003).
61. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, INDONESIA REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR
2001 (2002), available at http://www.state.gov/www/global/hurnan-rights/2001._hrpre-
port/indonesi.html (last visited Mar. 11, 2003).
62. Id.
63. S. RES. No. 91, 107th Cong. (2001), at 4, available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.
gov/cgibin/getdoc.cgi?dbnamne=107_cong-bills&docid=f:sr9lats.txt.pdf (last visited Mar.
13, 2003).
64. Slip Op., Civ. Action No. 00-674 (D.D.C. 2001) (on file with atithor at ILRF).
65. ld. at 45.
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of Exxon Mobil that this litigation, the one action that does not di-
rectly attack the government of Indonesia, will be the tipping point in
United States-Indonesia relations, losing their support for the admin-
istration's war on terror. The relationship between the two govern-
ments has weathered the numerous, consistent, and recent direct
attacks on the human rights record of Indonesia by all three branches
of the United States government. Moreover, the Indonesian govern-
ment is so anxious to have United States military aid restored that it
would not risk losing it simply because Exxon Mobil will face trial for
complicity in human rights violations, which all concerned must con-
cede are a matter of historical record. 66
Ironically, the Taft Letter itself could ultimately have a serious
negative impact on the United States effort to enlist allies in the war
on terrorism. As a New York Times editorial noted, the Taft Letter,
which followed the recent resumption of military aid to Indonesia,
"was an invitation to more abuse, a sign that human rights could be-
come a casualty of the anti-terror campaign." 67 This concern was ex-
pressed in more specific terms by Juliette N. Kayyem, a former
member of the National Commission on Terrorism, who stated in her
affidavit filed in the Exxon Mobil case:
Indeed, as many counterterrorism experts recognize, a major cause
of the Islamic world's anger towards the United States has been
because of the unfettered, and sometimes unlawful, activities of
U.S. companies on their soil. This sense of arrogance, felt by what
has come to be known as the "Muslim street," is, if anything, made
worse when the aggrieved parties are denied an audience by the
American judicial system. 68
The Taft Letter fails to make the case that the growing scope of
the war on terror should preclude private litigation under the ATCA.
That the Bush Administration even attempted to make the link to
benefit Exxon Mobil shows a disregard for the other, more serious
challenges facing our country in this struggle. It seems obvious to
most, including the wide range of critics of the Taft Letter discussed
above, that a strong policy of enforcing human rights is an important
component of, rather than in conflict with, the war on terrorism.
In conclusion, multinational firms that oppose the ATCA claim to
respect human rights, but aggressively oppose efforts to enforce a
66. See, e.g., McWilliams' Affidavit, supra note 38, 6.
67. Oily Diplomacy, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 2002, at A14.
68. Aff. ofJuliette N. Kayyem, In reJohn Doe I v. Exxon Mobile Corp. 6 (Aug. 28, 2002)
available at www.laborrights.org (on file with author at ILRF) [hereinafter "Kayyem
Affidavit"].
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small subset of those rights: the law of nations. Allowing the rule of
law to govern knowing violations of human rights by multinational
firms is an important first step in establishing a global economy based
on the values those companies, and all civilized societies, claim to sup-
port in principle. If the United States cannot lead by example to pre-
vent slavery, torture, and murder for profit, then no amount of
human rights rhetoric in the war on terrorism will be respected in the
practical, all-too-real world in which we live.
III. Summary of the ILRF's Cases Against Corporations That
Violate Fundamental Human Rights in Their
Business Operations
The ILRF cases described below are provided to illustrate that the
ATCA is being used to address some fairly extreme situations where
corporations may be knowingly participating in clear, well-accepted
violations of the law of nations. All of these cases, except Unocal's, are
in their early stages, but provide the great promise of holding compa-
nies accountable for human rights violations in which they directly
participated. In each of these cases, the allegations either identify spe-
cific company employees or agents who are responsible for causing
the human rights violations, or establish that the companies aided and
abetted the perpetrators. The cases are fairly routine applications of
traditional legal principles and have become controversial only be-
cause they may result in large verdicts against powerful corporations
that expected to enjoy a period of deregulation while the Bush Ad-
ministration and a Republican Congress are in power.
A. Unocal Corporation and Forced Labor in Burma (Myanmar)
In late 1992, Unocal Corporation entered a joint venture with the
government of Burma and the French oil giant Total (now called
Totalfina), to build a natural gas pipeline in Burma. Before undertak-
ing the project, Unocal hired outside consultants to conduct a "risk
assessment." The consultants expressly warned Unocal that the gov-
ernment of Burma uses systematic forced labor for virtually all con-
struction projects. Unocal also had access to years of reports by the
United States Department of State, the International Labor Organiza-
tion, Amnesty International, and Human Rights Watch. Despite the
express warnings the company received, it decided to go forward with
the project. Well into the construction process, Unocal hired another
outside consultant, John Haseman, a former military attach6 at the
United States Embassy in Burma, who specifically found that
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[b]ased on my three years of service in Burma, my continuous con-
tacts in the region since then, and my knowledge of the situation
there, my conclusion is that egregious human rights violations have
occurred, and are occurring now, in southern Burma. The most
common are forced relocation without compensation of families
from land near/along the pipeline route; forced labor to work on
infrastructure projects supporting the pipeline ... ; and imprison-
ment and/or execution by the army of those opposing such
actions.69
The company did nothing to alter its practices in response to these
explicit warnings.
In 1996, a group of Burmese citizens who were forced to perform
labor for the Unocal pipeline filed an ATCA case against the com-
pany. They had escaped from the ongoing forced labor requirements
into Thailand. Since the case was filed, Unocal has engaged in a pub-
lic relations campaign that falsely claims that the company is being
hauled into court simply for investing in a gas pipeline project in
Burma. The three different courts that have reviewed the evidence
have all concluded that Unocal knowingly benefited from slave la-
bor.7t Most recently, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that
plaintiffs' proffered evidence that Unocal and its co-venturers pro-
vided financial and material support to the military security forces
knowing that these forces were using forced labor. The court further
held that there is evidence of Unocal's active participation in the forced
labor activities.7 ' Far from simply being a passive investor, the evi-
dence establishes that Unocal:
* hired specific military battalions to perform security services,
clear the pipeline route, and build project infrastructure;
* knowingly permitted these battalions to force villagers at gun-
point to work for the project;
* used photos, maps, and surveys to show the military where they
needed helipads built and facilities secured;
* provided money, food, and equipment to the military forces that
were using slave labor; and
" made threats to human rights groups that any threats to the
pipeline would bring more soldiers and more forced labor. 72
Based on this and other evidence of Unocal's direct complicity in
slavery, the case should go to trial in mid-to-late 2003.73 If the Bur-
69. John Doe III v. Unocal Corp., 2002 WL 31063976 at *7-8 (9th Cir. 2002).
70. See, e.g.,John Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 110 F. Supp. 2d 1294, 1310 (C.D. Cal. 2000).
71. Doe III, 2002 WL 31063976 at *36, n. 22.
72. See, e.g., id. at 2-6.
73. The Unocal case is currently on two tracks. While the federal case was pending in
the Ninth Circuit, Plaintiffs filed their state law claims in the California Superior Court for
the County of Los Angeles (Nos. BC 237679 and BC 237980). It is the state court case that
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mese villagers prevail, other companies will have little to be con-
cerned about provided they are not direct participants in slavery.
B. Exxon Mobil's Use of Security Forces in Aceh, Indonesia to
Torture and Murder Villagers Living Near the
Company's Natural Gas Facilities
The ILRF's case against Exxon Mobil, John Doe I v. Exxon Mobil,74
alleges that the company, much like Unocal, hired the Indonesian
military to provide security for its natural gas facilities in Aceh, Indo-
nesia. Exxon Mobil did so knowing that these troops, like those re-
sponsible for the massacres in East Timor, would likely engage in
massive human rights violations against the local population. In fact,
the Exxon Mobil troops began a reign of terror in the area, and are
responsible for countless atrocities. The company received reports of
human rights violations committed by its security forces from local
groups, international human rights organizations, the United States
Department of State, the international press, and, surely, from its own
employees on the ground. Despite this knowledge, Exxon Mobil:
* required the government of Indonesia to designate one or more
specific battalions to provide security for the company;
" paid a regular fee to the security forces, and continues to do so,
despite the mounting evidence of atrocities committed by the
security forces;
" provided the security forces it hired with equipment, including
earth moving equipment that was used to create mass graves;
* provided the security forces with land for barracks that were used
as torture centers;
* coordinated security needs with the brutal military, and directed
these forces according the company's operations and needs; and
" demanded in 2002 that the government increase security, and
did so without regard to ongoing human rights violations. 75
The ILRF represents eleven villagers who suffered human rights
violations, including extrajudicial killing, torture, and crimes against
humanity. All of them have identified the specific Exxon Mobil forces
responsible for the violations. Several of them were tortured by the
security forces inside the Exxon Mobil compound in facilities pro-
is poised for trial. While the Ninth Circuit en banc review is pending, the state court has
held that California state tort law is sufficiently distinct from the ATCA to allow the state
trial to go forward independent of the further Ninth Circuit review.
74. No. 01CV01357 (D.D.C.) was filed in August 2001. Defendants' motion to dismiss
is pending. Oral argument was on April 9, 2002. Copies of the Complaint and the motion
papers are on file at ILRF. Current information about the case is available at www.labor
rights.org.
75. Id. at 11 39-47.
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vided by the company for the use of its security forces. Moreover, all of
the claims date from 2001, well after Exxon Mobil had specific knowl-
edge of massive human rights violations by its hired guns, and contin-
ued to provide them with financial and material support. Exxon
Mobil's motion to dismiss is pending in the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia. Among the issues before the court
is the legal effect of the previously discussed State Department letter
seeking to immunize Exxon Mobil from liability.
C. Coca-Cola's Use of Paramilitary Death Squads in Colombia to
Keep Unions Out of Its Bottling Plants
For years there has been comprehensive reporting from Colom-
bia that trade union leaders are targeted by paramilitaries for murder
and other human rights violations. 76 Much of this violence is directed
at leaders of unions at multinational firms, including the bottling
plants used by the Coca-Cola Company. One union representing
workers at Coca-Cola, Sinaltrainal, has sustained heavy losses of lead-
ers who were employed by the company. Since at least 1996, Sinal-
trainal has been writing letters to Coca-Cola demanding that the
targeting of trade union leaders at Coca-Cola bottling plants be
stopped. Yet no action was taken by the company to prevent the open
association between paramilitaries and managers of the Coca-Cola
bottling plants in Colombia. The ILRF case against Coca-Cola has
been filed on behalf of the trade union and five individual union lead-
ers who were murdered, tortured, and/or unlawfully detained. 77 The
allegation is that the paramilitaries were brought into the bottling
plants to use violence to exterminate the trade union with the specific
consent of the managers of the Coca-Cola bottling plants. In this case,
the connection to company officials is quite direct-plant managers
brought the paramilitaries into the plants for the specific purpose of
terrorizing union members. For example:
At the Coca-Cola bottling plant in Carepa, Colombia, the man-
ager appeared with several paramilitary members before the as-
sembled workers. He warned them to cease their union activities
or face retribution from the paramilitaries.
76. See, e.g., Human Rights Watch, The Ties That Bind: Colombia and Militaly-Paramili-
tary Links (Feb. 2000), at 2-3, available at http://www.hrw.org (last visited Mar. 19, 2003).
77. Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., Nos. 01-3208-CIV., 02-20258-CtV., 02-20259-CIV., 02-
20260-CIV (S.D. Fla). ILRF's co-counsel is Daniel Kovalik, Associate General Counsel of the
United Steelworkers Union. Defendants' motion to dismiss is pending. Oral argument was
in March, 2002. Copies of the Complaint and the motion papers are on file at ILRF. Cur-
rent information about the case is available at www.laborrights.org.
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* When the leaders of the union persisted in their representation
of workers, the paramilitaries returned and murdered Isidro Gil,
the head of the local union, inside the plant.
" The other workers were again gathered by the plant manager
and told to resign from the union or face the same fate as Mr.
Gil. All of the union members either resigned or fled the area. 78
The ILRF case raises several other specific instances in which
managers from the Coca-Cola bottling plants engaged paramilitaries
to torture and kidnap union leaders to discourage their trade union
activities. Coca-Cola purports to have a code of conduct that upholds
fundamental human rights in all of its operations worldwide, but is
claiming in the ILRF case that Coca-Cola is not responsible for what
happens in its bottling plants in Colombia. There is no question that
Coca-Cola profits from its foreign subsidiaries, but claims to have ab-
solutely no responsibility to those employed by them. As of the date of
this Article's publication, Coca-Cola's motion to dismiss is pending in
the United States District Court in Miami, Florida.
D. Drummond Company's Use of Paramilitary Death Squads in
Colombia to Murder Leaders of Colombian Mine
Workers Union
Similar to the situation with Coca-Cola, Drummond Company, an
Alabama coal mining company, has aggressively used paramilitary
death squads in Colombia in an effort to eliminate the leaders of the
Mine Workers Union that represents workers at the company's coal
mine in Colombia. 79 In early 2001, the leaders of the union were en-
gaged in heated negotiations with Drummond over several key issues,
including the demand that the company provide better security for
workers to protect them from paramilitaries that were based, along
with regular military, on Drummond's property.
According to several witnesses, the paramilitaries were operating
as a private security force to protect Drummond's facilities from leftist
guerrillas in the area. In the midst of the negotiations, two of the
union's top leaders were pulled off a company bus by paramilitaries
who said, in front of all of the workers on the bus, that the leaders had
a problem with Drummond.t ° One was shot in the head in front of
the other workers, while the other was taken away in a car; his dead
body, which showed clear evidence that he had been tortured, was
78. See Sinaltrainal, No. 01-3208-CIV 1 44-55.
79. See, e.g., S. Greenhouse, Alabama Coal Giant is Sued Over 3 Killings in Columbia,
N.Y. TIMEs, March 22, 2002, at A]4.
80. Id.
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found later that day. For a time, no one would take over the union
leadership posts out of fear that they too would be killed. Finally, in
September 2001, Gustavo Soler Mora assumed the Presidency. He re-
newed negotiations with Drummond, and sought again to bargain for
better security arrangements for the workers. On October 5, 2001,
within weeks of becoming President of the union, he too was pulled
off a company bus and murdered by paramilitaries.
In SINTRAMIENERGETICA v. Drummond Co.,8 ' the ILRF repre-
sents the surviving family members of the three murdered trade union
leaders. The case alleges that Drummond's management in Colombia
authorized the paramilitaries to target the union leaders for murder,
and provided the death squads with financial and material support,
including the following:
* paramilitaries, along with regular military, were provided land
for bases on Drummond's property;
* funds for security "services" for the paramilitaries were wired in
United States dollars to Colombia from the parent company in
Alabama;
" paramilitaries based on Drummond's property were provided
with fuel, along with other supplies and equipment; and
" the manager of Drummond's Colombian operation repeatedly
threatened the union leaders with violence if they persisted in
their demands to the company.82
The Drummond case is also awaiting a decision on the company's
motion to dismiss. The case is before the United States District Court
in Birmingham, Alabama.
E. Del Monte's Use of Torture to Eradicate the Leadership of the
Union Representing Workers in the Company's Banana
Plantations in Guatemala
Fresh Del Monte Produce ("Del Monte") owns and operates sev-
eral banana plantations in Guatemala. These plantations have long
been unionized by SITRABI, one of the most respected and profes-
sional unions in Guatemala. In 1999, Del Monte and SITRABI were in
negotiations regarding a massive layoff of workers in violation of the
collective bargaining agreement. At an impasse that left hundreds of
union members out of work, the leaders of SITRABI announced that
81. No. CV-02-BE-0665-W (N.D. Ala.). ILRF's co-counsel is Daniel Kovalik, Associate
General Counsel of the United Steelworkers Union. Defendant's motion to dismiss is
pending. Oral argument was in September, 2002. Copies of the Complaint and the motion
papers are on file at ILRF. Current information about the case is available at www.labor
rights.org.
82. See Sinaltrainal, No. 01-3208-CIV 1 38-54.
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the remaining workers would stage a walkout the next day. The eve-
ning before the planned work stoppage, Del Monte's local managers
organized a group of local thugs and abducted the key leaders of SI-
TRABI. The union leaders were taken to the SITRABI headquarters
and tortured with guns and threats of death. After enduring the tor-
ture for several hours, the union leaders agreed to call off the work
stoppage, resign from the union, and leave the area. In Enrique Villeda
v. Fresh Del Monte Produce Inc.,83 the ILRF represents seven of the lead-
ers, who allege that high level Del Monte managers were directly re-
sponsible for planning and implementing their torture and unlawful
detention. Their evidence of participation by Del Monte management
employees includes the following:
* Del Monte issued a threat to civic officials in Guatemala that if
SITRABI continued to engage in union activities on the com-
pany's plantation, Del Monte would divest from the area.
* A regional Del Monte manager met with the leaders of the gang
before they seized the union leaders.
" Del Monte's Director of Security for the Guatemala banana plan-
tations participated in the capture and torture of the SITRABI
leaders.
" Del Monte employees and agents prepared resignation letters
for the union leaders to sign while guns were pointed at their
heads.
* The morning after the union leaders were forced to resign from
the company and the union at gunpoint, Del Monte's General
Manager for the Guatemala operations took their resignation let-
ters to the Ministry of Labor, where he produced them as evi-
dence that the labor dispute was concluded. 84
After initial discovery, Del Monte has filed a motion to dismiss
with the United States District Court in Miami, Florida. The motion is
pending, and oral argument has not been held.
The cases discussed in the preceding pages represent the ILRF's
cases dealing with fundamental human rights violations committed by
corporations as part of their business operations, and from which they
are profiting.
There are other, similar cases brought against corporations
under the ATCA,8 5 most of which, like the ILRF cases, are based upon
83. No. 01-CIV- 3399 (S.D. Fla.). ILRF's co-counsel are Robert Sugarman and Marcus
Braswell of Sugarman & Susskind in Miami, Florida. Defendant's motion to dismiss is
pending. Copies of the Complaint and the motion papers are on file at ILRF. Current
information about the case is available at www.laborrights.org.
84. See Sinaltrainal, No. 01-3208-CIV 22-48.
85. For a good summary and regular updates of the ATCA cases against companies,
see eMonitors Legal Report, at http://xis.xtenit.com (last visited Mar. 31, 2003).
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solid evidence linking the defendant corporations to serious violations
of established categories of the law of nations. While it is indeed possi-
ble that frivolous cases or overbroad allegations can be filed under the
ATCA, just as with any other statute, this is not a sufficient basis for
eliminating use of the ATCA to pursue companies that have partici-
pated in extreme violations of human rights, such as murder and tor-
ture. However, led by USA Engage and NFTC, corporate opponents
of the ATCA ignore these well-developed cases and elevate a single
case, Ntzebasa v. Citigroup,86 as the poster child for their position that
companies are being exposed to burdensome litigation under the
ATCA. In that case, plaintiffs' counsel, Edward Fagan, has sued virtu-
ally all companies that were doing business in South Africa during
apartheid from 1948 to 1993.87 While it is premature to comment on a
case that was so recently filed, there is no question that, based on cur-
rent ATCA rulings, the plaintiffs will need to prove the knowing com-
plicity of the companies in specific acts to support apartheid that caused
injury to the specific plaintiffs. Indeed, based on a number of complex
foreign policy, political, and statutory issues, many of which would
also be presented by the Ntzebasa case, similar class claims brought by
victims of Japanese forced labor during World War II were all dis-
missed by the trial courts.88 Again showing the lack of candor in the
USA Engage/NFTC campaign, the corporate lobbyists do not high-
light that a second South Africa case, Digwamaje v. Bank of America,s"
makes specific allegations linking the corporate defendants with inju-
ries suffered by the plaintiffs. This inconvenient fact is ignored by the
corporate opponents to the ATCA in their campaign to use a single
case to discredit the many other cases that are explicitly based on spe-
cific corporate participation in human rights violations.9°
A theory that simply investing in South Africa during apartheid is
sufficient to have caused an injury to a group of victims is not even
remotely likely to prevail. As noted in section II, the federal courts are
86. 02 CIV 4712 (S.D. Cal. 2002).
87. See NFTC: The Alien Tort Claims Act: Correcting the Abuse of an Early Federalist
Statute 111 22 (Nov. 2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author at ILRF); see also
Magnusson, supra note 9, at 78.
88. See, e.g., Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d 424, 443 (D.C. N.J. 1999); In re
World War II Era Japanese Forced Labor Litig., 164 F. Supp. 2d 1160 (N.D. Cal. 2001).
89. No. 02CV6218 (S.D.N.Y.).
90. In its internal publication describing the ATCA cases, the NFTC does describe the
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well qualified to sort out frivolous cases, and until there is a ruling in
Ntzebasa that brings this assertion into question, the corporate com-
munity, not to mention the victims of human rights violations, would
be better served if the companies developed workable proposals for
addressing human rights violations in their international operations,
rather than severely damaging their credibility by raising premature
and exaggerated concerns about the South Africa and other cases.
Conclusion
All of the cases discussed above illustrate that only companies that
are knowing participants in extreme human rights violations face lia-
bility under the ATCA. Further, there is no question that serious viola-
tions of fundamental human rights occurred. Victims of slavery,
torture, and murder, unable to seek redress in their home countries
due to government complicity or toleration of the crimes, have sought
to use the ATCA to enforce the rule of law. Absent the availability of
the ATCA, the victims' claims may never be heard. The major factual
question in these cases is the level of complicity of the corporate de-
fendants. If there is ultimately no evidence of the companies' knowing
participation, the cases will be dismissed before trial. To prevent meri-
torious cases from going forward will not only be a major step back in
the effort to bring the rule of law to the world, it will subvert the judi-
cial process here in the United States.
In these trying times, it is crucial for the United States govern-
ment to show that no one is above the law, and that human rights
violators of every stripe will be held accountable. In asking the world
to respect human rights and abide by the rule of law, we must lead by
example and at least hold United States companies accountable to the
standards set at Nuremberg following World War II.
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